SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN NEW JERSEY LAW
In this section, the Seton Hall Law Review presents synopses of
recent New Jersey cases of interest to practitioners. In so doing, we hope
to assist the legal community in keeping abreast of some of the more
interesting changes in significant areas of practice.
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ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW-SENTENCING- UNIFORM IMPOSITION
OF PENALTIES NOT ABUSE OF DISCRETION-New Jersey Division

of Motor Vehicles v. Egan, 103 N.J. 350, 511 A.2d 133 (1986).
On October 14, 1982, Joseph Egan, who held a New Jersey
driver's license, was charged in Ohio with drunk driving and refusing to submit to a breath chemical test. After a hearing, the
State of Ohio suspended Egan's reciprocal driving privileges for
six months. 103 N.J. at 351-52, 511 A.2d at 134. The Ohio court
recognized that an unconditional suspension would gravely affect
Egan's ability to continue employment as a truck driver. Therefore, the Ohio court granted Egan occupational driving privileges as permitted under state law. Id. at 352, 511 A.2d at 134.
On March 8, 1983, pursuant to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:5-30.1
(West 1973), authorizing suspension of driving privileges in New
Jersey when reciprocal driving privileges have been suspended in
another state, the New Jersey Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV)
sent Egan a notice that his driving privileges would be suspended
for six months. Egan, 103 N.J. at 352, 511 A.2d at 134. The suspension was based on his refusal to submit to a breath chemical
test in Ohio. Following a hearing requested by Egan, the administrative law judge (ALJ) rendered an initial decision denying
Egan's request for occupational driving privileges. Id. Egan then
filed a certification with the director of the DMV, seeking reversal
of the ALJ's decision on the grounds that an unconditional suspension would result in the loss of his job. Id. at 352-53, 511
A.2d at 134. The director sustained the suspension and denial of
occupational driving privileges stating that the policy of the DMV
"is to impose the same penalty as if the offense had taken place in
New Jersey." Id. at 353, 511 A.2d at 134. On appeal, the appellate division affirmed the director's decision to suspend Egan's
driving privileges and the requirement that Egan successfully
complete an alcohol rehabilitation program. Id. at 353, 511 A.2d
at 135. The appellate division, however, remanded the matter
for reconsideration of Egan's request for occupational driving
privileges in light of the fact that he might lose his job. The New
Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the first part of the judgment of
the appellate division, but reversed the second part. Id.
Justice Garibaldi, writing for the majority, initially determined that the director of the DMV has the authority to grant
occupational driving privileges when another state has suspended a New Jersey licensee's driving privileges. Id. at 353-54,
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511 A.2d at 135-36. The court noted, however, that N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 39:5-30.1 (West 1973) provides that "'the director may
suspend or revoke the driving privilege of such resident in this
State ...

for a period not less than that for which the reciprocity

driving privilege was suspended or revoked in such other
State .... ' " Egan, 103 N.J. at 354, 511 A.2d at 135 (quoting N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 39:5-30.1 (West 1978)). Justice Garibaldi noted,
however, that driving privileges shall not be suspended or revoked for a period greater than that which would have been imposed had the conviction occurred in New Jersey.
In further support of its holding, the court relied on the Interstate Driver License Compact, NJ. STAT. ANN. § 39:5D-4
(West 1973), which provides for cooperation among states in reporting driving offenses and disciplining licensees. Egan, 103
N.J. at 355, 511 A.2d at 136. Specifically, that statute provides
that a state licensing authority may impose the "penalties of the
home State or the State in which the violation occurred" for convictions of driving while intoxicated. Id. (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 39:5D-4(a) (West 1973)). Thus, under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:530.1 and § 39:5D-4(a), the court ruled that the director of the
DMV has implicit discretionary authority to impose either New
Jersey's or Ohio's penalty for driving while intoxicated. Egan,
103 NJ. at 356, 511 A.2d at 136.
The court next held that the DMV director did not abuse its
discretion by denying Egan's request for occupational driving
privileges. Id. The court noted that so long as the policies are
reasonably grounded and formulated, they fall within the wide
statutory authority vested in the DMV. The court then reasoned
that the six month mandatory minimum suspension policy was
reasonable and in accordance with the policy of uniformly imposing New Jersey's more stringent penalties rather than those exacted by other states. Id. at 357, 511 A.2d at 137. Therefore, the
director properly exercised his discretion in imposing the penalties Egan would have received had his conviction occurred in
New Jersey and by denying Egan occupational driving privileges.
Id.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Clifford, joined by Justice
Stein, agreed that the director has the authority to grant occupational driving privileges to New Jersey licensees whose privileges
are suspended in other states. Id. at 358, 511 A.2d at 137-38
(Clifford, J., dissenting). Justice Clifford criticized the majority
for its failure to recognize that the director was unaware of his
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right to exercise discretionary authority, including the power to
choose the Ohio penalty and grant occupational driving privileges when he rendered his decision. The court, according to
Justice Clifford, should not sanction "a regulator's exercise of
discretion when he refuses to consider the full range of options
available to him[.]" Id. at 360, 511 A.2d at 138 (Clifford,J., dissenting). The justice concluded that the case should be remanded to the director for reconsideration of the policy of
imposing New Jersey's mandatory minimum suspension penalties
in light of this authority to issue work licenses.
While the court's decision in Egan supports current legislative policies of imposing strict penalties for drunk driving, it also
operates to encourage public administrators to render decisions
based on an across-the-board policy rather than on a case-by-case
basis. Where the legislature has authorized discretionary authority when imposing penalties, it is the obligation of the administrator to consider the specific facts which comprise each case and
the full spectrum of options available. Moreover, if the legislature had intended a policy of mandatory, uniform imposition of
penalties in connection with the enforcement of N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 39:5-30.1, the statute would have been drafted accordingly.
Consequently, when a public official fails to comprehend the applicable standards and guidelines governing its decision-making
authority, that official performs a public disservice.
Sandra L. Vieser

HOSPITALS-HOSPITAL'S

CLOSED-STAFF ADMISSIONS POLICY IN-

VALID IF DISCRIMINATORY IN NATURE AND NOT IN FURTHERANCE OF PUBLIC HEALTH-CARE NEEDS-Desai v. St. Barnabas
Medical Center, 103 N.J. 79, 510 A.2d 662 (1986).

In 1969, St. Barnabas Medical Center sought to reduce overcrowding and overuse of its facilities by instituting a "closedstaff" admissions policy. This admissions policy provided that
only licensed physicians affiliated in private practice with one of
the hospital's current staff members would be granted staff privileges. 103 N.J. at 84, 510 A.2d at 664. Mahesh Desai, M.D., a
duly licensed physician and private practitioner specializing in internal medicine and gastroenterology, had his third application
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for staff privileges rejected by St. Barnabas in June of 1981. Id. at
84-85, 510 A.2d at 665. Dr. Desai's rejection was affirmed by the
hospital's Joint Conference and Credentials Committee on the
additional grounds that his specialized skills were not in short
supply and that the number of medical and surgical beds was limited. Id. at 85, 510 A.2d at 665.
In an action against the hospital, Dr. Desai alleged that the
closed-staff admissions policy was arbitrary and discriminatory.
Id. at 83, 510 A.2d at 664. He requested that the trial court compel the defendant to grant him staff privileges. Id. The trial
court found that the defendant's closed-staff policy was reasonable and lawful due to the potential overcrowding of its facilities,
particularly the endoscopy room. Id. at 85-86, 510 A.2d at 665.
The trial court thus upheld the hospital's denial of staff privileges
and concluded that the closed-staff policy was reasonable and
lawful. Id. at 86, 510 A.2d at 665. The appellate division affirmed the decision in aper cunam opinion. Id. at 83, 510 A.2d at
664. The NewJersey Supreme Court granted Desai's petition for
certification on the basis of his original complaint, as well as the
additional claim that the defendant's closed-staff policy was in restraint of trade and violated the New Jersey Antitrust Act, NJ.
STAT. ANN. § 56:9-4(a) (West Supp. 1986). Desai, 103 NJ. at 97,
510 A.2d at 671.
On appeal, the supreme court reversed the decisions of the
lower courts and instructed the hospital to grant Desai staff privileges, unless it could be shown that his credentials were sufficiently lacking so as to otherwise disqualify him for admission.
Id. at 99, 510 A.2d at 672. The court held that the defendant's
adoption of a closed-staff hiring policy was not in itself unlawful,
but that its requirement of affiliation with a staff physician was
unreasonable, failed to serve any public health purpose, and arbitrarily discriminated against otherwise qualified physicians. Id.
In addition, the appellant's antitrust claim was dismissed for lack
of sufficient evidence. Id.
Justice Handler, writing for a unanimous court, noted that
the value of a closed-staff policy is determined by its ability to
serve the health-care needs of the public. Id. at 93, 510 A.2d at
669. The court found that a closed-staff policy was necessary to
further St. Barnabas' public health-care objectives. Id. at 94, 510
A.2d at 670. The court held, however, that the affiliation requirement served merely as a thinly-veiled means of disguising an
otherwise discriminatory hiring practice. Id. The court reasoned
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that affiliation with a staff physician provided no discernible benefits to the general public. Id. at 96, 510 A.2d at 671.
In reaching its decision, the court emphasized that a closedstaff policy which restricted the ability of patients to choose a
good doctor-hospital combination did little to further publichealth objectives. Id. at 87, 510 A.2d at 666. The court then observed that, by denying staff privileges to Dr. Desai, his patients
who resided nearby would be forced to seek alternate hospital
facilities in remote locations. Id. at 95, 510 A.2d at 670. The
patients, therefore, would be prohibited from selecting their desired doctor-hospital combination. Id.
The court recognized that the Health Care Facilities Planning Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:2H-1 to -52 (West Supp. 1986),

which enables New Jersey to exert both regulatory and supervisory control over hospital functions, nevertheless grants broad
discretionary powers to individual hospitals. Desai, 103 N.J. at
88, 510 A.2d at 666. The court noted, however, that these discretionary powers exist solely for the purpose of serving public
health-care needs, including the rights of patients to choose their
physicians as well as the accessibility of hospital facilities. Id. at
91, 510 A.2d at 668. Justice Handler concluded that the discretionary powers which have been granted to hospitals by the State
of New Jersey are fiduciary in nature and, as a result, are subject
first and foremost to the public interest, which is not advanced by
arbitrary discrimination. Id. at 90, 510 A.2d at 668.
The Desai court acknowledged the broad discretionary powers of individual hospitals in formulating their own staffing policies, subject only to the needs of the public. In addition, the
court attempted to restrict the application of a closed-staff policy
to situations in which it will likely benefit the public, and it readily
acknowledged the inherent potential for employment discrimination. According to the court, the closed-staff policy is a necessary, though not foolproof, means of safeguarding the public
interest. By invalidating the exclusionary criterion of St. Barnabas's admissions policy, the court firmly established its position
that discrimination, regardless of the disguise employed, will not
be tolerated. Although the decision serves as a warning to hospitals who might otherwise abuse their discretionary powers, the
court nevertheless failed to set forth adequate guidelines by
which the public interest can be defined in the context of a
closed-staff policy. Given no limitations on the extent of the pub-
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lic interest, it may prove difficult in the long run to determine
where public policy ends and employment discrimination begins.
Andrea Morganelli

INSURANCE-COVERAGE EXCLUSIONS FOR INTENTIONAL ACTS BY
INSURED IN AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE POLICIES NOT

PRECLUDED BY NO-FAULT ACT OR PUBLIC POLICY-Allstate In-

surance Co. v. Malec, 104 NJ. 1, 514 A.2d 832 (1986).
On October 17, 1981, Leah Wilcox drove her mother's car
without permission. Wilcox's mother reported the incident to
the police, and a high speed chase ensued. The chase extended
into Gloucester Township where John Malec, a Gloucester
Township police officer, joined in the pursuit. In the course of

stopping and apprehending Wilcox, Malec's police vehicle was
repeatedly rammed by Wilcox. 104 N.J. at 4, 514 A.2d at 833-34.
At the time of this incident, Wilcox qualified as an insured under
her mother's automobile liability insurance policy issued by Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate).
Malec asserted claims for injuries arising from the collision.

Id. at 5, 514 A.2d at 834. Allstate, relying on a specific provision
in the policy excluding liability coverage for intentional acts of
the insured, denied coverage and sought a declaratory judgment
that its automobile liability insurance policy did not provide cov-

erage for Wilcox's liability to Malec. Id. Both parties moved for
summary judgment. In granting Malec's motion, the trial court
held that the New Jersey Automobile Reparation Reform Act
(No-Fault Act), N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 39:6A-1 to -20 (West 1982),
which requires both personal injury protection (PIP) and liability
coverage, provided for coverage exclusions only as applied to
PIP. Malec, 104 NJ. at 5, 514 A.2d at 834. Therefore, the trial
court reasoned that the legislature did not intend to permit liability coverage exclusions.
The appellate division affirmed summary judgment for
Malec holding that New Jersey's No-Fault automobile insurance
statutes preclude a coverage exception for intentional acts. Id. at
6, 514 A.2d at 834. The appellate court determined that to allow
the exclusion "would violate the policy of construing automobile
insurance legislation liberally in favor of broad protection for ac-
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cident victims." Id. The supreme court granted certification and
unanimously reversed the lower courts.
Justice Clifford, writing for the court, held that the No-Fault
Act does not require liability carriers to indemnify the intentionally wrongful acts of their insureds. Id. at 9, 514 A.2d at 836.
Justice Clifford found no intention by the legislature to overhaul
the liability component of New Jersey's automobile insurance
system. The legislature's primary purpose in enacting the NoFault law, Justice Clifford opined, was to provide personal injury
protection coverage on a first-party basis " 'without regard to
negligence, liability or fault of any kind.' " Id. at 8, 514 A.2d at
836 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-4 (West 1982)). The court
held, therefore, that the No-Fault package of first-party benefits
was intended to supplement, not supplant, the tort liability
system.
Justice Clifford determined that the innovative nature of this
first party reparation system caused the legislature to specify in
detail the types of losses that were covered and the nature of the
benefits provided. Id. In addition, the Act provides an exception
"when the accident victim [is] injured while committing certain
crimes or 'while acting with specific intent of causing injury or
damage to himself or others.' " Id. at 9, 514 A.2d at 836 (quoting
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-7 (West 1982)). Furthermore, Justice
Clifford found that provisions of the New Jersey automobile insurance statutes neither require liability coverage for intentional
acts of an insured-tortfeasor nor prohibit exceptions from insurance coverage for such intentional behavior. Justice Clifford
noted, moreover, that public policy militates against insurance
indemnification for the civil consequences of an insured's intentional wrongdoing. Id. at 11, 514 A.2d at 837. The court, having
found that Allstate's coverage exception was not in violation of
statute nor inconsistent with public policy, remanded the case for
a determination of whether Wilcox acted with the specific intent
necessary to trigger the liability coverage exclusion. Id. at 13,
514 A.2d at 838.
Although the court in Malec reaffirmed the principle that individuals should not be able to insure themselves against the economic consequences of their intentional wrongs, Justice Clifford
acknowledged that this general rule must continue to be read in
light of Ambassador Insurance Co. v. Montes, 76 NJ. 477, 388 A.2d
603 (1978). In that case, a divided court held, in the context of a
fire insurance case, that absent a specific clause excluding liability
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coverage for the insured's intentional wrongdoing, coverage
could not be denied. Justice Clifford, in Malec, specifically reserved the question whether, absent such a specific exclusion
provision, a liability carrier should be called upon to indemnify
an insured for his intentional wrongdoing. Malec, 104 N.J. at 12,
514 A.2d at 838.
The willful intent to injure another is a serious matter. This
is particularly true when the instrument used to inflict injury is an
automobile. The practical effect of the court's decision in Malec
will be to uphold the principle of non-indemnification of intentional wrongdoers in automobile liability cases. As noted by the
court, virtually all automobile liability insurance policies written
in New Jersey contain coverage exclusions for the intentional
misconduct of the insured. See id. at 11, 514 A.2d at 837. Intentional tortfeasors should feel a financial burden for the injury
they cause. Moreover, the principle of not indemnifying wrongdoers is, as the court found, particularly well suited to automobile cases because the claimant has available alternate sources of
recovery, including workers' compensation benefits, uninsured
motorist coverage, and PIP benefits.
Edward M. Suarez, Jr.

RIGHT TO

DIE-TERMINATION OF MEDICAL TREATMENT-TER-

MINALLY ILL INDIVIDUAL MAY REMOVE RESPIRATOR SUBJECT

TO COUNTERVAILING STATE INTERESTS-In

re Farrell, 212 NJ.

Super. 294, 514 A.2d 1342 (Ch. Div. 1986).
In 1982, Kathleen Farrell of South Toms River, then a thirtythree year old key punch operator and mother of two, gave up
her job when she began to have difficulty using her hand and
arm. Doctors diagnosed her condition as amyotrophic lateral
sclerosis, also known as Lou Gherig's disease, a fatal and incurable nervous system disorder. 212 N.J. Super. at 296, 514 A.2d
at 1342. By 1983, she was confined to bed. She progressively
lost the use of her limbs and all body control below her head.
Due to her inability to swallow solid foods, she was restricted to a
liquid diet, causing her weight to drop more than sixty pounds.
By the summer of 1983, she could no longer breathe on her own
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and a tracheotomy was performed so that a respiratory tube
could be inserted. Id. at 296-97, 514 A.2d at 1342-43.
Early in 1986, after consulting with her doctor, a psychologist, and family members, Mrs. Farrell decided she wanted the
respirator removed. Id. at 298, 514 A.2d at 1343. Accordingly,
her husband applied to the superior court to be appointed her
special medical guardian, with express permission to remove the
respirator. Id. at 296, 514 A.2d at 1342. Her testimony was
taken in June 1986 at the family home and, although she had difficulty communicating, it was clear that "she had no second
thoughts about her decision to terminate the respirator." Id. at
298, 514 A.2d at 1343.
In granting the application, Judge Wiley held that a determination of competency must first be made. Id. at 299, 514 A.2d at
1344. He therefore considered whether Mrs. Farrell could reasonably understand her condition and the risks accompanying
the discontinuance of treatment. Id. (citing In re Shiller, 148 N.J.
Super. 168, 180-81, 372 A.2d 360, 367 (Ch. Div. 1977)). Judge
Wiley concluded that Mrs. Farrell was capable of expressing her
wishes and fully understood the consequences of her decision.
Id.
Once he established that Mrs. Farrell was capable of making
"an informed consensual decision," Judge Wiley noted that " 'a
competent adult person generally has the right to decline to have
any medical treatment initiated or continued.' " Id. at 300, 514
A.2d at 1344 (citations omitted). Judge Wiley cautioned, however, that this right is not absolute as it occasionally must yield to
society's countervailing interest in preserving life. Id. (citing In re
Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985)).
Judge Wiley analyzed the four societal interests denominated in Conroy which must be considered in cases dealing with
the termination of life-sustaining treatment: preservation of life,
prevention of suicide, safeguarding the integrity of the medical
community, and protection of innocent third parties. See id. at
300-03, 514 A.2d at 1344-46. As to the first interest, he found
"no fact or unique situation present that could in any way cause
the state interest in preserving life to outweigh her right, as a
competent adult, to self-determination, privacy, bodily integrity
and the like." Id. at 301, 514 A.2d at 1345. Similarly, the state's
interest in preventing suicide would not be fostered by preventing the termination of medical treatment since the patient "has
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merely asked ...

[that] the disease take its natural course.

Id.
Judge Wiley next determined that the state's interest in safeguarding the integrity of the medical profession was not an overriding factor because "no hospital, doctor, health care
professional, or institution [opposed] Mrs. Farrell's decision. . .

."

Id. Judge Wiley reasoned that "[t]o force Mrs. Farrell

to continue to suffer the horrors this disease has inflicted on her
would be too great a cost to justify medical intervention against
this competent patient's wishes." Id. at 302, 514 A.2d at 1345.
Finally, Judge Wiley examined the state's interest in protecting
innocent third parties who may be affected by the patient's decision. He noted that both of Mrs. Farrell's children supported her
in this action and that the children would continue to be raised
by their father and would be well provided for. Id., 514 A.2d at
1345-46. Accordingly, Judge Wiley was able to distinguish those
cases in which the state's interest in protecting third parties was
held to outweigh the rights of the terminally ill individual. Furthermore, he noted that "the Farrell family will soon have to face
Mrs. Farrell's death due to the terminal nature of her illness in
any event, and the family appears to be prepared for the inevitable occurrence." Id. at 302-03, 514 A.2d at 1346.
Since no compelling state interest barred the termination of
Mrs. Farrell's medical treatment, Judge Wiley concluded that to
ignore Mrs. Farrell's wishes would violate her constitutional
rights of freedom of self-determination and right of privacy. Id.
at 303, 514 A.2d at 1346. He therefore approved the appointment of her husband as Mrs. Farrell's guardian ad litem with the
power to cause the respirator to be removed. Id. at 304, 514
A.2d at 1347.
Judge Wiley's opinion reflects a common sense approach to
a sensitive issue. It is unclear, however, whether this approach
will be appropriate to cases in which the quality of the life in
question is not quite as poor as Mrs. Farrell's. The legislature
should address itself to this pressing concern. Until that time,
however, the courts of this state must undertake the difficult task
of balancing the rights of the terminally ill and the interests of
society.
DavidJ. Reilly

486

SE TON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17:476

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RIGHTS OF SPEECH AND ASSEMBLYDEMONSTRATORS PROHIBITED FROM PICKETING PREMISES NOT

DEVOTED TO PUBLIC UsE-State v. Brown, 212 N.J. Super. 61,
513 A.2d 974 (App. Div. 1986).
On May 26, 1984, Lucille Brown and other anti-abortion
demonstrators picketed the Cherry Hill Women's Center, a private medical facility offering various services including abortions.
212 NJ. Super. at 62, 513 A.2d at 975. Brown refused a request
to leave the Women's Center premises and was arrested and
charged with criminal trespass. Id. Brown sought to enjoin her
prosecution in a civil suit. Id. at 62-63, 513 at A.2d 975. A municipal court judge convicted Brown of trespass, which was sustained on appeal to the law division. Id.
The appellate division affirmed the judgment of the lower
courts. Id. at 68, 513 A.2d at 978. Judge Fritz, writing for the
court, observed that the New Jersey Constitution provides a
more expansive view of freedom of expression than does the
United States Constitution. Id. at 63, 513 A.2d at 975. The chancery division's earlier holding in this case prescribed that when
an owner " 'has not sufficiently dedicated the property to public
use so as to entitle individuals to access for first amendment [to
the United States Constitution] activity' " was deemed consistent
with federal policy. Id. (citing Brown v. Davis, 203 N.J. Super. 41,
46, 495 A.2d 900, 903 (Ch. Div. 1984)). Consequently, the same
result would have been achieved under either the New Jersey or
United States Constitution. Id. In support of the appellate division's holding, Judge Fritz affirmed the factual determination of
the lower court which held that the premises of the office complex where the health-care facility was housed was not for public
use and that its tenants and invitees entered the property only
upon specific invitation. Id. at 65, 513 A.2d at 976.
In reaching his decision, Judge Fritz focused upon the three
prong standard which should be considered in determining
"'the parameters of the rights of speech and assembly upon privately owned property and the extent to which such property reasonably can be restricted to accommodate these rights.' " Id. at
64, 513 A.2d at 976 (citing State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 563, 423
A.2d 615, 630 (1980) appeal dismissed sub nom. Princeton University
v. Schmid, 455 U.S. 100 (1982)). The tripartite standard adopted
by the Schmid court includes consideration of "(1) the nature,
purposes, and primary use of such private property, generally, its
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"normal" use, (2) the extent and nature of the public's invitation
to use that property, and (3) the purpose of the expressional activity undertaken upon such property in relation to both the private and public use of the property." Id.
The court, however, noted that the three prong test does not
apply in Brown since the property owner or tenant did not devote
the property to "public use" as commonly found in freedom of
expression cases. Id. at 66, 513 A.2d at 977. The court determined that the normal use of the property was for professional
offices and the only invitation offered to the public was limited to
women who seek services provided by the Women's Center. Id.
Judge Fritz continued, however, to analyze Brown in light of the
three prong test. See id.
The court first held that the "normal use" of the property
was not analogous to a suburban shopping center or a place
which attracts the general consumer. Id. For example, the Women's Center only solicits a narrow segment of the population.
Id. Moreover, the office complex has no common areas other
than walkways or parking lots where groups of people may assemble to distribute literature. Id.
Judge Fritz next examined the second prong of the test and
concluded that the case at bar also failed that prong. See id. The
extent and nature of the invitation of the Women's Center " 'is
clearly for private and personal purposes.' " Id. at 67, 513 A.2d
at 977 (citing Planned Parenthood of Monmouth v. Cannizzaro, 204
NJ. Super. 531, 540, 499 A.2d 535, 540 (Ch. Div. 1985)). Moreover, Judge Fritz opined that the advertisements of the Center
are not a general invitation to the public to enter the premises.
Id. at 67, 513 A.2d at 977. In focusing on the third prong, the
appellate division relied on the lower court's reasoning " 'that
the purpose of the expressional activity [the demonstrators] seek
to engage in is incompatible with some of the services rendered
by the Women's Center.'" Id. (citing Brown v. Davis, 203 N.J.
Super. 41, 47-48, 495 A.2d 900, 904 (Ch. Div. 1984)). Although
the Center did not dispute the demonstrators' use of the right-ofway, " 'any expansion of the area... would be incompatible with
the right of the tenant Women's Center to receive.

. .

peaceable

possession and quiet enjoyment of the leased premises.' " Id. (citation omitted).
The appellate division's decision demonstrated a reluctance
to expand state constitutional rights of freedom of expression to
usurp private property ownership rights. The result achieved by
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the appellate division was to restrict citizen's rights of expressional activity to "public" areas which, absent special circumstances, does not include multibusiness office buildings. Brown
thus extends private property interests beyond the grounds of an
office building to encompass the parking lot facilities. The court,
as a result, places an onerous burden upon citizens by limiting
their grievances or expressional activity to the streets.
Analisa F. Sama

PROFESSIONAL

RESPONSIBILITY-A-r-rORNEY

FAILING

TO

COMPLY WITH COURT ORDER REQUIRING SUBMISSION OF WITNESS LIST WILL NOT BE HELD IN DIRECT CONTEMPT IF ADEQUATE

EXPLANATION IS PROFFERED--In re Lependorf, 212 N.J.

Super. 284, 514 A.2d 1335 (App. Div. 1986).
Barbara R. Lependorf represented a defendant in a capital
murder case. A pretrial order was issued which required that a
list of prospective defense witnesses be provided to both the
court and the prosecutor prior to or at the beginning of the trial.
212 N.J. Super. at 285-86, 514 A.2d at 1336. On October 17,
1985, during the third day of jury selection, Lependorf gave the
trial judge a list of five potential witnesses. Id. at 286, 514 A.2d
at 1336. When the trial judge inquired why the names were not
submitted earlier, Lependorf explained that only two of the witnesses had been interviewed and that the other three still had not
been interviewed. Id. Lependorf further contended that despite
the fact that she had a list of fifty or sixty names, that list did not
actually constitute a potential witness list because she did not
consider an individual to be a potential witness until that person
had been interviewed and found to have some pertinent information. Id. at 286-87, 514 A.2d at 1336-37. The trial judge rejected

Lependorf's explanation for failing to disclose the witnesses'
names earlier and he held her in direct contempt of court. Id. at
287, 514 A.2d at 1337.

At the conclusion of the criminal trial, Lependorf filed a motion to dismiss the trial judge's contempt order and vacate the
penalties. Id. at 288, 514 A.2d at 1338. Lependorf claimed that
the contempt charges should not have been summarily determined by the trial judge; rather, the issue should have been sub-
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mitted to another judge for adjudication after the disposition of
the murder case. Id. The trial judge, however, denied the
motion.
On appeal, the appellate division reversed the lower court.
Id. at 294, 514 A.2d at 1341. The court noted that the record was
unclear as to the exact reason for holding Lependorf in contempt. Specifically, it was not clear whether the contempt order
derived from the trial judge's broad interpretation of the attorney's obligation to supply all of the fifty or sixty persons who had
come to her attention as possible witnesses, even if no interview
or investigation had been conducted, or because the trial judge
made a factual finding that Lependorf knew for some time before
submitting the list that "one or more persons were likely to be
called as defense witness." Id. at 291, 514 A.2d at 1340. The
appellate court determined that either basis was insufficient to
warrant a summary adjudication of the contempt proceeding. Id.
As a result, the contempt order was reversed and the matter remanded for a full hearing. Id. at 294, 514 A.2d at 1341.
Judge Skillman, writing the opinion of the court, observed
that a direct contempt order, within the purview of N.J. CT. R.
1:10-1, is issued when the judge finds conduct to be so offensive
that it obstructs the administration of justice. The court noted,
however, that "[i]f there is some evidence of the adequacy of the
explanation, the judge should characterize the matter as an indirect contempt and proceed by order to show cause returnable
before another judge." Lependorf, 212 NJ. Super. at 289, 514
A.2d at 1339 (quoting In re Yengo, 84 N.J. 111, 127, 417 A.2d 533,
542 (1980)). The court then held that Lependorf's explanation
for her delayed submission of a witness list was not "insulting,
frivolous or clearly inadequate" but rather had some "semblance
of adequacy." Id. at 290, 514 A.2d at 1339. Judge Skillman concluded that Lependorf's explanation reduced the need for dealing immediately with the offensiveness of the contempt charge.
Id. Therefore, the court held that the contempt proceedings
against Lependorf should have been referred to another judge
for hearing. Id.
The appellate court interpreted the pretrial order as not requiring Lependorf to submit a list of every person who was
known or who may have had information favorable to the defendant. Id. at 291, 514 A.2d at 1340. The order, which required the
defendant to submit a list of witnesses, was interpreted in light of
N.J. CT. R. 3:13-3(b)(3). This rule provides for production of the
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names of "persons known to defendant whom he may call as a
witness at trial. ...
Lependof,
_" 212 N.J. Super. at 291, 514 A.2d
at 1340 (quoting N.J. CT. R. 3:13-3(b)(3)). To require a defendant to reveal the names of individuals prior to ascertaining
whether the information held by those persons was exculpatory,
in the court's view, could cause potentially serious constitutional
problems. Id. For instance, Judge Skillman opined that a defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel may be impaired
or the privilege against self-incrimination violated if an attorney
is compelled to disclose a list of witnesses possessing inculpatory
information. Id. at 292, 514 A.2d at 1340.
Judge Skillman further reasoned that Lependorf may have
been held in contempt if it could have been shown that she had
known of one or more persons who were to serve as witnesses
but failed to supply the names of those individuals to the court
and the prosecutor. Id. Since there were inconsistent statements
made by Lependorf as to whether she possessed such knowledge,
the appellate division ruled that the trial judge should not have
attempted to resolve those inconsistencies. Id. This premise,
coupled with the fact that the attorney-client privilege may have
prevented Lependorf from providing an adequate explanation as
to the late submission of the witness list, warranted a full hearing.
Id. at 292-93, 514 A.2d at 1340-41. Consequently, the trial judge
should have accepted Lependorf's explanation and referred the
contempt charge to another judge. Id. at 294, 514 A.2d at 1341.
In Lependorf, the court applied the contempt proceedings
rules articulated by the New Jersey Supreme Court in In re Yengo,
84 N.J. 111, 417 A.2d 533 (1980). Although the Yengo court held
that the unexcused absence of an attorney in a criminal proceeding constituted direct contempt, the court in Lependorf ruled that
failure to submit a list of witnesses was indirect contempt. In its
decision, the Lependorf court attempted to distinguish what type
of attorney misconduct would be considered direct or indirect
contempt. By ruling that a failure to submit a witness list constitutes indirect contempt, this decision limits the presiding judge's
power to conduct summary contempt proceedings. Thus, the
court's ruling ensures greater fairness to attorneys charged with
contempt by requiring a full hearing on the merits with a detached and independent judge.
Lastly, the appellate division correctly ruled that the trial
judge interpreted the pretrial order requiring a defendant to supply potential defense witnesses to the court too broadly, despite
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the fact that the defense had not yet ascertained whether the witnesses possessed exculpatory information. Such a sweeping application of an order would certainly infringe a defendant's
constitutional rights to effective assistance of counsel and privilege against self-incrimination.
Gerard M. Giordano

EVIDENCE-PHYSICIAN-PATIENT

PRIVILEGE WILL NOT BAR AD-

MISSION OF BLOOD TESTS INVOLUNTARILY TAKEN FROM SURVI-

AUTO ACCIDENT-State v. Figueroa, 212 N.J.
Super. 343, 515 A.2d 242 (App. Div. 1986).
VOR OF FATAL

Juan Figueroa was injured in an automobile accident which
resulted in the death of a person in another vehicle. Figueroa
was unconscious as he was transported to the hospital and, subsequently, a blood sample was taken and tested to determine his
blood-alcohol level. Id. at 345, 347, 515 A.2d at 243-44. Once
Figueroa regained consciousness, he made statements from his
hospital bed to the police regarding the accident. These statements as well as the defendant's blood test results were admitted
into evidence at trial. Id. at 345, 515 A.2d at 243. Pursuant to
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-5 (West 1976), Figueroa was convicted
of death by auto. Figueroa, 212 N.J. Super. at 345, 515 A.2d at
243.

Figueroa appealed on the ground that the trial judge improperly admitted this evidence. Specifically, he asserted that the
blood test results should have been excluded from evidence because it violated the physician-patient privilege. Id. Moreover,
according to the defendant, there was insufficient proof regarding the test's reliability. The defendant argued that the bloodalcohol test results at the hospital were too remote to have been
admissible. Lastly, Figueroa asserted that his statements made at
the hospital should have been excluded as evidence because they
were made during custodial interrogation, thus requiring Miranda warnings. Id. at 349, 515 A.2d at 245. Judge Fritz, writing
for the appellate court, dismissed all of the defendant's arguments, except for the physician-patient privilege issue. Id. at 345,
515 A.2d at 243. This issue was remanded back to the trial court

492

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 17:476

for a determination whether a subpoena for the blood tests
should be issued. Id. at 348, 515 A.2d at 244.
In reaching its decision, the court rejected the state's contention that the test results were admissible based on the "interaction" of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-22.5 (West 1968) and N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 26:2B-24 (West 1977). Figueroa, 212 N.J. Super. at
346, 515 A.2d at 243-44. The former section expressly denies
the privilege "as to information which the physician or patient is
required to report to a public official or as to information required to be recorded in a public office." Id., 515 A.2d at 243
(quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2B-24 (West 1977)). The latter
section requires that the Division of Alcoholism "shall...

con-

duct tests for alcohol in the bodies of automobile drivers and
pedestrians who die as a result of

.

. traffic accident[s] and in

automobile drivers who survive traffic accidents fatal to others."
Id. (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2B-11 (West 1977)). Judge
Fritz declared that § 26:2B-24 was enacted only to "assure the
integrity" of the data collection process and to aid in the study of
alcoholism. According to the court, this section was not intended
to override the physician-patient privilege. Figueroa, 212 NJ.
Super. at 346, 515 A.2d at 243. Conversely, the court reasoned
that § 2A:84A-22.5 was intended to remove obstacles which
might impede the investigation of probable criminal activity. Id.
at 346-47, 515 A.2d at 243-44.
Judge Fritz stated that this case should be resolved in accordance with the principles set forth in State v. Dyal, 97 N.J. 229,
478 A.2d 390 (1984). Figueroa, 212 N.J. Super. at 348, 515 A.2d
at 244. He observed that "Dyal dissects, examines, diagnoses and
prescribes respecting the tension existing between the competing
policies" dealing with drunk driving at one end of the spectrum
and the physician-patient privilege at the other. Id. at 347, 515
A.2d at 244. The appellate division ruled that, in accepting the
stipulation of the parties which amounted to little more than a
police report, the trial court failed to consider the significant factors and competing interests present in Dyal. Accordingly, the
specific question to be determined on remand was "[i]f. . .the
evidence available to the police officer at the time of the accident
or within a reasonable time thereafter had been presented at the
time of the testing to a judicial officer who applied the Dyal criteria, would a subpoena for the record of the blood tests have
[been] issued." Id. at 348, 515 A.2d at 244. According toJudge
Fritz, if the trial judge answered this question in the affirmative,
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the judgment would be affirmed; alternatively, if the trial judge
answered the question in the negative, the judgment would be
overturned. Id.
The court further rejected Figueroa's argument regarding
the possible inaccuracy, and hence unreliability, of the Automatic
Clinical Analyzer used in testing his blood. Judge Fritz stated
that there was sufficient credible evidence on the record to support the state's contention that the Automatic Clinical Analyzer
was acceptable and reliable. Id. at 349, 515 A.2d at 245. Finally,
the court dismissed Figueroa's argument that his bedside statements at the hospital to the police should have been excluded as
evidence. Judge Fritz asserted that the record, taken as a whole,
supported the trial court's finding that there was no custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings. Therefore, Figueroa's
statements were deemed voluntary, credible, and reliable. Id. at
350, 515 A.2d at 245.
This decision is an equitable resolution of the potential conflicts that arise between legislative pronouncements and the physician-patient privilege. The Figueroacourt recognized that while
this statutory privilege is important, it has the practical effect of
preventing the disclosure of valuable evidence in drunk driving
cases. The court refused to allow this privilege to interfere with
New Jersey's policy objective of ridding the roads of drunk drivers. The Figueroa decision attempts to reinforce this commendable objective.
Sherilyn P. Lisowski

PRODUCTS LIABILITY-DAMAGES-JURY MUST BE

CHARGED

AS TO PRESENT VALUE PRINCIPLES WHEN CALCULATING VALUE
OF FUTURE LossEs-Friedman v. C & S Car Service, 211 NJ.

Super. 657, 512 A.2d 560 (App. Div. 1986).
On July 29, 198 1, Kenneth J. Friedman, an Assistant Professor at the University of Medicine and Dentistry, sustained a fracture of his left wrist when his automobile crashed into another
vehicle. 211 N.J. Super. at 660, 512 A.2d at 561. The accident
resulted from the failure of a defectively designed master brake
cylinder which had been installed in Dr. Friedman's car by defendant C & S Car Service. The brake cylinder had been
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purchased from defendant Rallye Imported Auto Parts, Inc., who
obtained it from defendant Columbia Motor Corp. Id.
Plaintiff filed suit for the defective production of the brake
cylinder. In his closing argument, plaintiff's counsel used a
"time unit" summation, pursuant to N.J. CT. R. 1:7-1(b), which
provides that a party in its closing statement may " 'suggest to
the trier of fact, with respect to any element of damages, that
unliquidated damages be calculated on a time-unit basis without
reference to a specific sum.' " Id. at 662, 512 A.2d at 562-63
(quoting N.J. CT. R. 1:7-1(b)). Plaintiff asked the jury to consider
the pain and suffering endured by Dr. Friedman each day when
calculating its award of damages. Using this per diem method,
the plaintiff's attorney requested that the jury arrive at the ultimate award by multiplying the daily figure by the number of days
of the year (365), and then multiplying this number by the life
expectancy of the plaintiff in years, as established by the table in
Appendix I to the New Jersey Rules of Practice. Id. at 662-63,
512 A.2d at 563-64.
Except for the plaintiff's summation, there was no other testimony which would give the jury any guidance in ascertaining
damages. See id. at 664, 512 A.2d at 564. Pursuant to N.J. CT. R.
1:7-1(b), however, the trial judge cautioned the jurors that the
plaintiff's summation was not evidence, but merely argumentative. Friedman, 211 N.J. Super. at 664-65, 512 A.2d at 564-65. He
also advised that the plaintiff's thirty year life expectancy was not
a fixed rule; rather, it was to be considered in conjunction with
the other factors for damages. Id. at 665, 512 A.2d at 565. At no
time was the jury informed that either the present value of future
damages or inflation should be considered in awarding damages.
Id. at 664, 512 A.2d at 564.
The jury found the defendants liable to the plaintiff for damages and awarded $875,000 to Friedman and $10,000 to his wife.
Id. at 659, 512 A.2d at 561. The defendants appealed the excessive amount of the award and the appellate division reversed and
remanded the case for a new trial to determine damages. See id.
at 675, 512 A.2d at 570.
In examining the trial court's jury instructions, Judge Simpson determined that the trial judge erred in failing to advise the
jurors as to the present value of future losses after allowing the
plaintiff to instruct the jury on the time-unit method of calculating the award. Id. at 666-67, 512 A.2d at 566. The court ruled
that such an omission could cause an unjust result, since it was
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very likely that the jury had used the time-unit method to calculate damages without considering the present value principle. Id.
at 669, 512 A.2d at 567. Judge Simpson further noted that, because the jury instructions had referred to the Life Expectancy
Tables in Appendix I of the New Jersey Practice Rules, the jurors
should also have been informed of the Present Value Table in the
same appendix. Id. at 667-68, 512 A.2d at 566-67. The court
noted that such information was " 'important, if not essential to a
complete and proper charge; counsel might well have expected
these subjects to be treated in the charge without advance request.'" Id. at 669-70, 512 A.2d at 567 (quoting Housen v. Olesky,
71 N.J. Super. 95, 98, 176 A.2d 297, 299 (App. Div. 1961)) (emphasis in original). Therefore, Judge Simpson concluded that
when the per diem method is used, the charge of present value of
future damages is essential to a proper damages charge. Id. at
670, 512 A.2d at 567. In reaching its decision, the court noted
that its objective was to grant a nonexcessive, yet fair and reasonable compensatory award to the plaintiff. Id. at 667, 512 A.2d at
566.
The court rejected the plaintiff's contention that there was
no error since the trial judge had also failed to give an inflation
charge to the jury. Id. at 670-71, 512 A.2d at 568. It was the
plaintiff's belief that these two figures would nullify each other,
and therefore, in failing to give both, no error was committed. In
declining to accept this "offset" theory, Judge Simpson reasoned
that the uncertainty of both inflation and investment returns
makes the theory debatable and as such "should not be adopted
in NewJersey as a rule of law." Id. at 672, 512 A.2d at 568. The
court advocated, however, that when the jury has been given a
time-unit argument for calculating damages, it must also be instructed as to inflation and the present value of future losses, especially if there has been no expert testimony to assist the jurors.
Id.
The decision in Friedman is one which is clearly directed toward achieving the dual goals of fair compensation and
nonexcessive awards. Though the necessity of instructing the
jury of the present value of future losses has not been addressed
by the New Jersey Supreme Court, it is readily apparent. Judge
Simpson's opinion provides adequate guidelines to assist jurors
in achieving just results.
James M. Beach

